Debate persists over the place of conscience in medicine. Some argue for the complete exclusion of conscientious objection, while others claim an absolute right of refusal. This paper proposes that claims of conscientious objection can and should be permitted if they concern kinds of actions which fall outside of the normative standard of medicine, which is the pursuit of health. Medical practice which meets this criterion we call medicine qua medicine. If conscientious refusal concerns something consonant with the health-restoring aims of medicine, it entails a desertion of professional duty. If, however, it relates to something other than medicine qua medicine, it can rightly be refused. It thus becomes possible to test instances of conscientious objection to determine their validity, and thereby conserve both the principle of conscientious objection and define its scope. This test of conscience prevents arbitrary discrimination, and preserves doctors' agency. It is a theoretical razor rooted in the practical reasoning of medicine whose operation will prompt, if nothing else, reflection on the goals of medicine.
Introduction
Conscientious objection (CO) in medicine has been the subject of much recent debate. Some believe that doctors are entitled to conscientiously refuse to perform any procedure, 1 while others maintain that a doctor's conscience should not interfere with a patient's access to healthcare services, 2 but if it does, this amounts to a desertion of professional duty, 3 an act of 'dishonourable disobedience'. 4 Although this latter view is gaining ground in academic debate, a recent study found that most medical students would refuse to participate in euthanasia and ritual circumcision on grounds of conscience. 5 Another revealed that some Muslim medical students think it is appropriate to conscientiously refuse consultations with patients of the opposite sex. 6 Does conscience have a place in medicine? And, if so, what is it?
On one hand, alleged appeals to conscience can be used to justify laziness and prejudice. It is not difficult to imagine examples of this: the physician who refuses to prescribe antiretrovirals to a homosexual patient because he disapproves of his conduct; the religious fundamentalist who refuses to treat alcoholics because of his own teetotal convictions; the surgeon who dismisses all patients older than 70 because of their disproportionate use of resources. These alleged appeals to conscience are intuitively displeasing. 7 But other claims appear more reasonable. A doctor who declines to perform an abortion because she has recently miscarried herself is easier to sympathise with than an ageist surgeon. Surely, basic empathy deters the suggestion that she should be coerced into taking part in abortive procedures. It is difficult to successfully argue that her reasoned distress counts for nothing.
Additionally, history shows that medical practice changes over time. As late as the C20th doctors administered compulsory sterilisation to women for social and eugenic purposes. The practice enjoyed broad approval and was backed by government policy across the globe. 8 But would we not now praise doctors who refused to take part in it? Similarly, do we not commend those German and Japanese doctors who refused to put their skills to cruel and genocidal ends in Second World War? The obvious answer to these questions suggests that CO and refusal in medicine are necessary in principle. The medical profession has been commandeered and become corrupted at various times, and is, as history proves, capable of serious moral error. This is reason enough to presuppose that conscience cannot be excluded a priori.
Nevertheless, conscience requires qualification. It cannot rightly be an abracadabra to eschew duties or legitimise prejudice. Work needs to be done to establish a way of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate appeals to conscience. There exist good treatments of conscience in the medical ethics literature already, which focus on conscience as a fundamental feature of the rational and reflective nature of human beings, and the appended importance of personal integrity. 9 Although conscience is not an infallible moral guide, it is far more than a selfish or subjective sensation, and it is also distinguishable from religious commitments. 9 Unfortunately, these points rarely receive due attention. Although we do not directly consider them here, we uphold them by proposing an objective criterion by which appeals to conscience can be tested. Conscience is ineluctably subjective to some degree (which is no bad thing), but we hope that introducing an element of objectivity will advance the debate which surrounds its application. If our proposal fails, we hope that it will (at least) prompt reflection on current medical practice. This is not the last word in the CO debate; it informs only one aspect of CO in healthcare. The groundwork concerning the nature and importance of conscience 9 must be settled before our test can be applied. Hence, ours is not an argument for the continued existence of CO in medicine, but rather is a test for sorting between appeals to conscience once the possibility of these is admitted in principle.
Our test is philosophical razor which states that CO is valid if it concerns a matter which does not confer or restore health. In other words, if a given procedure, P, does not intend to confer or restore health in him who undergoes it, a doctor may conscientiously refuse to perform P, for his duties as a doctor do not extend beyond the restoration of health, which is the goal of medicine. If, however, he refuses to perform procedure Q, which is designed to restore health, there should be a presumption against accepting his refusal concerning Q.
This excludes arbitrary or self-serving appeals to conscience because conscience itself is being tested. It also considers the nature of procedures/actions and the objective standard of the goals of medicine. We denote medical practice which aligns with these goals by medicine qua medicine (MQM), in contradistinction to that which is formally medicine because it is practiced by doctors, but does not intend the restoration of health.
Not everything a doctor does is MQM. Much has been done in the name of medicine which is not worthy of the name. Hence, it must be distinguished along descriptive and normative lines: what is or was the case in clinical practice is not necessarily in conformity with the norm of medicine as set by its goals. Consideration of the goals of medicine is useful for examining the validity of current practices, while also leaving open the possibility of CO. Medicine, like any practical discipline, deals in uncertainty, and therefore does not lend itself to absolutism; 10 it is perilous, therefore, to exclude from the outset the possibility of selfdoubt and dissent.
This proposal does not pit a patient's desires against the doctor's will nor does it attempt commensurate these. Nevertheless, it permits a doctor to refrain from what is not in conformity with the norm of medicine, as it acknowledges the uncontroversial historical truth that physicians can and do stray from the profession's essential prerogative to restore health. If a medical act or procedure is counter or superfluous to MQM, there is a good case for permitting its conscientious refusal, withstanding the characteristics of conscience. 9 In general, what is MQM cannot be conscientiously refused, while that which is not can. This distinction permits a physician to refuse what he is not obliged to do by the norm of his profession. He cannot rightly do less, but he is not obliged to do more. It seems to us that this test of conscience has not figured prominently in the debate on CO.
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For our argument to succeed, an extensive defence of its terms is required. Beforehand, it is worth briefly considering some competing theories of CO and showing why these are inadequate. Following this, a discussion of the professional standards and goals of medicine is provided, before we conclude by suggesting how our test can be applied in clinical practice.
Competing concepts of conscience
Mark Wicclair has identified three main ways of thinking about CO. 12 The first is conscience absolutism, according to which the doctor is under no obligation in any instance to participate in that which conflicts with his conscience. 12 This theory is manifestly unworkable in practice because unqualified respect for conscience obviates the idea of duty. If a physician were permitted to refuse to take part in any procedure purely on the basis of taste or convenience, it is hard to see that his well-recognised duty of care could be fulfilled in any serious sense. 13 It should therefore be recognised that CO cannot be applied indiscriminately.
Secondly, there is the compromise view. 12 It states that a physician may exercise CO, but must be prepared to refer patients to a colleague willing to do what he is not. In the eventuality that such a colleague is unavailable, however, the physician must meet the patient's request. The apparent ability to balance patient needs and physician conscience is appealing. Yet, it is too much and too little: too much because it is inconsistent to allow a doctor to fall short of his duty merely because a colleague can pick up the slack; too little because it sometimes forces a physician into a potentially deeply distressing situation. This certainly is a compromise -but not a coherent one: the existence and endurance of a doctor's duty should not lean so heavily on practical considerations. Arguably, then, the compromise view pays mere lip service both to conscience and professional duty. It is not therefore a sound principle on which a practical and reasonable policy of CO can rest.
The third option is the incompatibility thesis, whereby any conflict between a patient's request and a doctor's conscientious refusal to provide it constitutes a failure of duty (which should entail disciplinary procedure). 12 Simply, conscience has no place in medicine because it is a hindrance to care. 2 This view has the disadvantage of depriving a physician of moral agency. Nevertheless, it is true that doctors have duties towards patients which they are not permitted to default on without consequence. But the failure of the incompatibility thesis to consider the nature and kinds of acts being conscientiously refused and the historical moral failures of medicine means it misunderstands these duties. It views patient rights as absolute and transcending all circumstances. This error is not unique to the incompatibility thesis. Conscience absolutism does something similar by making conscience inviolable and disregarding its context. The compromise view does not find a happy middle between these two poles, for it too allows patient rights to override a physician's conscience if the opposite is impractical. It thereby reveals the assumption that, when push comes to shove, patient 'rights' trump conscience, whatever the cost to the physician. Put differently, conscience absolutism and the incompatibility thesis make the opposite errors of prioritising the doctor's conscience and the patient's legal right, respectively. The compromise view assumes that these are commensurable quantities -but only if it is practical. It seems that there is little to recommend any of these three views.
Additionally, they all share a common error: the assumption that a solution to the dilemma of physician conscience and patient rights can be found by references to one or both of these concepts only. Such a starting point creates a deadlock between patient and doctor, strips doctors of moral agency, and patients of any serious rights. This stalemate cannot be resolved without increasing the number of terms in the debate. In our view, until the nature and norms of medicine are considered, and the sphere in which conscience can operate is defined practically by reference to these, it will be difficult to generate a workable theory of CO in medicine.
A recent paper illustrates the need for proper definition in this regard. Its authors deny that 'professionals are entitled to subvert the objectives of the profession they voluntarily joined', and that, hence, there can be no CO if what is required 'falls within the scope of professional practice'. 3 This might appear unobjectionable as such, but the authors believe that it is the 'wishes of society' which define this scope. 3 This fails to reckon with an objective and historical view of medicine, and makes all current practice obligatory simply because it is current. There is no room for self-doubt on behalf of these authors, who perhaps believe that the medical profession is now vaccinated against all future moral failing. Current practice cannot be used a yardstick for morality without reference to some other principle. It is therefore not necessarily the case that a doctor who refuses to participate in a certain procedure is defaulting on his duty, if duty is defined by a higher principle than current expectations or practice. Duty is not defined by mere convention or majority opinion. In short, although every physician is duty-bound to act in accordance with the principle or norm of his profession, no physician is duty-bound to subvert or go beyond it. But what is this professional norm by which conscience is to be tested?
The nature and norm of medicine
Medicine as a profession
Before the nature of the norm of medicine is considered, it is necessary to establish that, because medicine is a profession, 10 it is not defined or normed by practice or plebiscite. Thus, not all practised 'medicine' is necessarily medicine qua medicine.This distinction is key to defining the realm within which the physician can exercise CO.
Professions possess a specialist body of knowledge and skills, and apply it to the pursuit of a particular good end, which end defines professional standards. The goods pursued by professions are best thought of as ends in themselves -internal goods such as knowledge, practical wisdom, virtue -which beget beneficial effects -external goods, i.e. health.
14 Associations of professionals pursue and preserve the good(s) appropriate to a given realm, e.g. medicine, law or theology. 15 These pursuits are ends in themselves, while their external goods are the natural consequence of their existence.
Associations of professionals which promote excellence in medicine, such are royal colleges in the United Kingdom, thus aim at the advancement and preservation of the goods innate to medicine, which simultaneously safeguards its external goods. 14, 16 High professional ideals keep patients safe and ensure the continuity and refinement of medical tradition.
Professions and their guilds are, therefore, not subservient to political, economic or social agenda because they serve a particular form of internal good which transcends government. 14, 17 This is why professions are (or should be) autonomous from the state. 18 Medicine cannot rightly be thought of merely as a means to a socio-political end determined by public opinion or government diktat. The medical profession, as the guardian of the goods of medicine, must set its own standards -and this not merely by intraprofessional vote, but by reference to its first and controlling principles. The internal goods of medicine are the normative standard by which practice and practitioners are to be judged. They determine the true scope of professional duty which a physician may not rightly desert. 19 Therefore, simply because a practice is lawful or widely accepted, it does not follow that it is necessarily in conformity with the goals of medicine. This can only be denied by asserting that contemporary medicine is completely morally virtuous (and that there is no possibility of debating this point) or that medicine is nothing by a nose of wax. The medical profession can and has erred. It needs to be checked by its own norms and principles. This raises the question: what is this norm?
The restoration of health is the norm of medicine Let us imagine that someone requests a particularly unusual body piercing from their doctor. It becomes clear that, for it to be performed safely (not in a dimly-lit backroom of a tattoo parlour), asepsis and anaesthesia are required. This minor operation undoubtedly requires a doctor's skill, therefore. But if a doctor were to take part in it, would he be practising medicine? Or merely facilitating a 'lifestyle' intervention? The mere fact of a doctor's providing this service does not necessarily align it with the goals of medicine. It would not be MQM to use one's surgical skills to perform female genital mutilation, however hygienically and painlessly. Neither a piercing nor genital mutilation confers a health benefit, and so neither are part of MQM.
Thus, we take the norm of medicine to be the restoration of health; MQM is what aims at the restoration of health. 20 To intend less than this is bad medicine, while to aim for something other than health, however nobly, is not strictly medicine. Thus, the above examples cannot be MQM because they do not intend the restoration of health. Therefore, a doctor should be permitted to refuse to participate in them; they are not his proper duty. 21 We will argue that several things commonly done by doctors do not aim at the restoration of health. But, lest we are accused of ignoring the popular understanding of health, we consider one proleptically. 22 Those who wish to maintain the World Health Organisation's (WHO) definition of health as a 'state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity' 23 might not be easily convinced that a doctor may rightly exercise CO. If health encompasses not only the treatment of disease but also abstract matters such as wellbeing, what rational principle can prevent every possible intervention or procedure which increases wellbeing from counting as the practice of medicine? And, therefore, how could any patient's request for health or wellbeing be rightly withheld? Without a distinction between health and wellbeing, or health and happiness, there is no logical endpoint for the reach of medicine. 24 Medicalisation of all lack of wellbeing is a manifestation of our 'therapeutic age', a legacy of psychoanalysis, 25 whereby all of life's ills, and not just illnesses, are laid out on the examination couch. Medicine is thus given carte blanche to exercise its influence on every aspect of human life.
Of course, complete wellbeing is far too ambitious a goal for medicine. The pursuit of complete wellbeing is a boundless task, one more complex than those trained in the art of medicine should presume to pursue. 26 It is medical hubris to reduce all human problems to medical problems. 27 Doctors should recognise their limited capacity to bring about human happiness. It is not something they can infuse into patients. Rather, by treating disease, they restore to patients the opportunity to pursue happiness for themselves once again. The WHO, by conflating wellbeing and health, arguably makes medicine the servant of an insatiable master, and hands doctors undue power and status. 28 Aristotle, writing about the nature of happiness, pertinently remarks: 'here is the root of the controversies about the nature and causes of happiness: some people treat as parts of happiness items that are no more than its necessary conditions'. 29 Doctors cannot prescribe happiness or wellbeing, but can often mitigate one thing which prevents its pursuit: disease. Doctors deal in beneficence, and specifically inhealth, which is one good among many others (knowledge, wealth, opportunity, etc.). But it is to this sphere of good which the doctor must confine himself to. This specific beneficence which doctors strive for in their professional capacity should not be conflated with general beneficence.
Failure to realise these things makes medicine impossibly broad in scope and allows the medical profession to think too highly of itself. It also squeezes CO out of clinical practice: if medicine's scope is borderless, how can a practitioner legitimately refuse to meet a patient's wish? Hence, the WHO's definition is conceptually flawed, makes medicine a commodity, the physician into a dispenser of wellbeing, and thereby makes all CO a moral failure.
Therefore, the norm of medicine is better understood as health in a narrower sense. Definitions of health which allow for the absence of disease in conjunction with poor health are impractical and ideological. A more modest and realistic definition of health is needed if the scope of a doctor's duty is to be established.
Defining health and disease
The definition of health has been hotly contested. 30 This essay cannot provide a comprehensive account of the concept. In the absence of a fuller definition, and having already rejected one popular definition of health, we borrow loosely from some work done by the Hastings Center 31 to formulate a working definition which is practically useful and recognisable to those who practice medicine.
Health is the absence of disease, where disease is a bodily state which impedes or threatens participation in life and its pursuits 32 (acquisition of knowledge, social interaction, etc.), or threatens life, and is due to dysfunction of the body, and not merely on mental states. It is the loss of normal bodily function which actually or potentially interferes with participation in life's activities. Hence, someone with an asymptomatic malignant brain tumour would be classed diseased, while the person requesting the unusually invasive body piercing would not. It is not sufficient for a state to be unpleasant or undesirable for it to be a disease (nor vice versa). Diseaseis not determined by social convention or prejudice; it resides in the body. 33 From this practical definition, we infer that not all actions currently performed by doctors aim at the restoration of health. If these do not intend at the restoration of health, they fall outside of MQM, and thus outside of the scope of professional duty, and can rightly be conscientiously objected to.
Putting conscience to the test
A doctor is not duty-bound to subvert or go beyond the restoration of health, which is the norm of medicine. There can be no sanctions, therefore, for failing to do something which goes beyond the norm of medicine, or which appears to be against it. Hence, some of what doctors currently take part in can be legitimately conscientiously refused. Examples include elective abortion, active euthanasia, ritual circumcision, prescribing contraception, 34 sterilisation and cosmetic surgery. 35 None of these things entail the practice of MQM, for they do not intend to restore health. All of them require the involvement of those trained in medicine, but they do not promote the health of the patient according to the definition we offered: pregnancy, life, foreskin, fertility and plainness, although they can influence happiness, are not diseases. 36 It would be equally true to say that the Japanese physicians who carried out medical experiments on Chinese prisoners in Unit-731 during Second World War were not practising MQM, although their work was predicated on medical expertise. It has long been known that by the very possession of such expertise the physician is capable of great harm. Yet, when a physician intentionally harms, he cannot be said to be practising medicine properly. The same is true, we argue, when he acts in a way which does not aim at the restoration of health, and he is therefore not duty-bound to do so.
CO is invalid, however, if it results in a failure to practice MQM. A physician's personal prejudices or opinions cannot be accommodated if these run counter to the restoration of health. The physician may legitimately conscientiously refuse to perform a procedure that does not constitute MQM, but he does not have the right refuse to do that which does. This can be illustrated with some examples.
Some practical examples
A junior doctor of a religious persuasion is working on a gastroenterology ward. His patient requires antibiotics for peritonitis, a condition caused by liver cirrhosis, itself due to chronic alcohol abuse. Because he attributes alcoholism and its related diseases to divine retribution, he considers that the patient does not deserve treatment. Yet, although this disease is self-inflicted, it remains a disease, and it is the norm of medicine to restore health. Therefore, to refuse to treat it, even for religious reasons, constitutes inappropriate CO. It is manifestly against the aims of the profession encompassed in MQM not to offer this patient treatment.
Here are two examples of valid CO. Firstly, a young woman consults a surgeon and requests a mastectomy to improve her golf swing, which currently hinders her enjoyment of life. 37 The surgeon declines to operate because a mastectomy, apart from treating (or possibly preventing) breast cancer, is not consonant with MQM. Breasts, inelegant golf swings, and displeasure with these are not a strictly diseases, so it is not a doctor's duty to mitigate them. 38 Therefore, he may legitimately refuse to operate.
Secondly, a junior doctor begins a community gynaecology rotation. A patient awaits a medical abortion, and she is asked to prescribe the necessary drugs. Because of the nature of the act, she may rightly register CO. Pregnancy per se is not a disease, 39 meaning that abortion is not MQM, since it does not restore health. Thus, her conscience must be accommodated. Mitigating something which is not strictly a disease is not strictly medicine, and is therefore not a duty of a doctor. Although an abortionist is required to be a doctor by law, a doctor is not required to be an abortionist by definition.
Strengths and limitations
By more clearly defining the duty of a doctor, our argument further justifies the place of conscience in medicine, 40 while also protecting patients from its abuses. Importantly, it makes concessions on reasoned grounds to those who wish to limit their practice to what the norm of medicine dictates. We hope that this razor, which cannot reasonably be abstracted from a full understanding conscience, 9 will contribute to the debate around CO. One possible contribution it makes is its resistance against the temptation to confine CO to religious commitments. By our account, persons of any faith and none have the liberty to exercise CO within the given parameters. Religious affiliation is often cited as a reason for registering CO, but it is unfair to deprive those who do not belong to a religious group, or whose religious grouping does not proclaim upon the relevant matters, of the liberty of conscience. 41 However, we wilfully concede that, if applied, our argument might delay some patients' access to services delivered under the auspices of a healthcare organisation. This, we suggest, is a price all should be willing to pay. The only way that all patients can access all services without hindrance would be to entirely annul the physician's agency and coerce him to act beyond the normative standard of his profession. This is compatible neither with the aims of medicine nor with the continuing existence of a free society.
It should be said that our argument has nothing to say against things which are an intrinsic part of good medical practice such as good record-keeping and basic care (it would be to abuse our argument to use it to evade such tasks under the pretext that it does not aim at the restoration of health). Such things are not particular to certain acts of procedures and are an inescapable and necessary part MQM. We would underline, in addition, that the focus of our account is on kinds of actions and not individuals or groups of people.
The validity of CO is tested in our framework by its reference to the goals of medicine, and whether what is conscientiously objected aligns with these. It is not based on the characteristics or identities of patient, and cannot, therefore, be accused of inequity.
Conclusion
We have argued that appeals to conscience can and must be admitted in medicine if they relate to what is not aimed at the restoration of health, the normative standard of medicine as a profession. CO can therefore be exercised regarding that which is not MQM, that which does not intend the restoration of health.
Our test of conscience successfully preserves the physician's moral agency while also protecting patients from his whim and prejudice. It accounts for the nature of kinds of actions, and their relation to the norm of medicine, although it is only a practical adjunct to a system which already admits the fundamental importance of conscience. If nothing else, further reflection on the goals of medicine is needed in this debate. If, as Aristotle says, 'the task of medicine is not to ensure that any old good should be where it belongs, but that health should be', 28 it behoves those who employ doctors not to push them beyond this this point. function, cannot be considered a disease merely because of occasional inconvenience. But this says nothing against those genuine diseases (e.g. gigantomastia) which would be most inconvenient in the instant example. 39. We acknowledge that pregnancy, while not being a disease itself, can cause disease or injury. Moreover, if the mother's life is in danger, we recognise some circumstances where an 'abortion' would be in conformity with the goals of medicine. 40. Though this essay has primarily considered CR in relation to doctors, it also applies, mutatis mutandis, to other disciplines such as midwifery and nursing. 41. The recent of case of Ellinor Grimmark, a midwife and Pentecostal Christian, underlines this point. 42 Although her church supported her conscientious objection against abortion, it does not have formal or official grounds for doing so, unlike, say, the Roman Catholic Church or one of the Reformed denominations subscribing to the Westminster Standards (e.g. the Orthodox Presbyterian Church). It seems unjust that the ecclesiology and traditions of her religious grouping should affect her right to conscientiously object to abortion, for the reasons we have laid out in this paper. Moreover, it is not evident why religious groups are privileged in this inconsistent fashion: surely people without faith are entitled to liberty of conscience as much as the religious people and groups are. 42. Fleming V, Ramsayer B and Zaksek TS. Freedom of conscience in Europe? An analysis of three cases of midwives with conscientious objection to abortion. J Medical Ethics 2018; 44: 104-108.
